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THE CIRCUMVENTION OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION:  
TWO BITES AT THE APPLE, OR A RESTORATION OF 
EMPLOYEES’ STATUTORY RIGHTS? 
Joseph A. Arnold* 
INTRODUCTION 
A successful advertising company hires Jackie on a full-time 
basis.  She quickly establishes herself as a quality employee and her 
performance evaluations are excellent.  Six months after beginning 
work, Jackie faints on the job and subsequently takes a two-day 
medical leave of absence.  Apparently, Jackie has lupus1 and suffered 
a negative reaction to a change in medication she was taking to 
control and prevent arthritis.  During day two of Jackie’s doctor 
recommended leave, her manager telephones and fires her.  He 
explains that the company cannot employ someone who, due to 
repeated absence, could potentially threaten the efficiency of the 
workforce.2 
Believing she was wrongfully discharged, Jackie files a lawsuit 
against her employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (“ADA”).3 It appears, however, that Jackie’s employer requires 
all prospective employees to sign a company arbitration agreement 
whereby all employee claims are submitted to arbitration. Based on 
the precedent established by the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. 
 
* J.D., 2003, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2000, The Pennsylvania State 
University. 
 1 Lupus is a chronic inflammatory disease that affects various parts of the body, 
especially the skin, joints, blood, and kidneys.  LUPUS FOUNDATION OF AMERICA, INC., 
Definition of Lupus, at http://www.lupus.org/education/definition.html (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2003) (on file with author).  It is an autoimmune disorder that causes the 
immune system to lose its ability to tell the difference between harmful substances 
and its own cells and tissues.  Id.  The immune system then makes antibodies that 
fight against itself causing a wide range of complex medical problems, including 
death.  Id.  More than 16,000 Americans develop lupus each year.  Id.  It is estimated 
that 500,000 to 1.5 million Americans have been diagnosed with lupus.  Id. 
 2 This fact pattern mirrors an actual case.  See infra notes 148-161 and 
accompanying text (discussing EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002)). 
 3 The ADA prohibits discrimination in the hiring, firing, or treatment of a 
qualified individual with a disability.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2003). 
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Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,4 Jackie’s employer invokes the arbitration 
agreement and the trial court dismisses the claim. Under Gilmer, the 
Supreme Court held that such an agreement is not only enforceable 
regarding disputes arising out of an employment contract, but also to 
federal statutory employment claims.5  As a result of being forced into 
arbitration, Jackie may not pursue her claim in court and, therefore, 
is not afforded the benefits of a jury trial, complete discovery, or the 
protections of the ADA. 
In the wake of Gilmer, employees like Jackie who sign arbitration 
agreements often find themselves with no ability to enforce their 
federal statutory rights in court.6  The Civil Rights Act of 19917 (“1991 
CRA”), which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 
(“Title VII”) and the ADA,9“” is meant to grant victims of intentional 
discrimination the right to punitive damages and a jury trial.10  
Despite Congress’s efforts to strengthen enforcement of Title VII and 
the ADA, courts have upheld Gilmer and remained loyal to enforcing 
arbitration agreements.11 
Whether arbitration effectively resolves civil rights claims, 
however, is a contentious subject.12  As compared to litigation, 
 
 4 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 5 Id. at 26. 
 6 In Gilmer, for example, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff 
Robert Gilmer’s discrimination claim against his employer because Gilmer signed an 
arbitration agreement.  Id. at 26-27.  The Court held that a claim under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2003) (“ADEA”), could be 
subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement.  Id. at 23. 
 7 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
 8 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 
(2003).  See infra note 60 for further discussion. 
 9 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2001). 
 10 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74 (1991). 
 11 See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 4 (1st 
Cir. 1999) (stating that “application of pre-dispute arbitration agreements to federal 
claims arising under Title VII . . . is not precluded . . . by Title VII as amended by the 
1991 CRA”). 
 12 For analysis and discussion on the various characteristics of arbitration, both 
good and bad, as they relate to statutory claims, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Corp., 
415 U.S. 36, 56-58 (1974) (discussing the unsuitability of arbitration for the 
resolution of statutory claims).; See also RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: 
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 126-52 (1997) (comprehensively discussing 
the differences between arbitration and litigation, and addressing the potential 
pitfalls of arbitration); see generally Julian J. Moore, Arbitral Review (Or Lack Thereof): 
Examining the Procedural Fairness of Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1572 (2000); Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: 
Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443 (1998); Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory 
Employment Disputes: A Public Policy Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME 
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employees can benefit from arbitration because of its comparatively 
low cost and faster resolution time.13  Others, however, argue that 
Congress granted specific protections for employee rights and the 
court system is the intended forum for the exercise of those rights.14  
If arbitration is not well-suited to handle statutory discrimination 
claims, the arbitral forum could represent a substantial erosion of 
Congress’s important anti-discrimination initiatives.15 
Part I of this Comment examines the history and development of 
labor arbitration, which shows that arbitration is a favored and 
important method of dispute resolution.  Part II addresses the 
historical status of arbitration, revealing that although arbitration was 
once voluntary, both Congress and the courts now enforce 
agreements to arbitrate.  Part II also traces the emergence of 
workplace statutory rights and demonstrates how courts—even when 
these important rights are at issue—enforce arbitration agreements.  
This discussion focuses on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Alexander 
v. Gardner Denver Co.16 and Gilmer.17 
Next, Part III analyzes the arbitral process, explaining the 
potential pitfalls employees face when arbitrating statutory rights, and 
ultimately concluding that the arbitral forum is unbalanced in favor 
of employer interests and is not well-suited for the resolution of 
statutory claims.  Part IV then details two recent Supreme Court 
decisions, EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,18 and Wright v. Universal Maritime 
Service Corp.,19 that elucidate the potential unfairness of employees’ 
 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173 (1998). 
 13 BALES, supra note 12, at 153, 157.  Professor Bales reports that litigating 
employment discrimination claims could take up to several years, while arbitration 
can sometimes be resolved in a matter of months.  Id. at 153.  Professor Bales also 
cites to a Bureau of National Affairs report revealing that companies have reported 
being able to arbitrate between fifteen and twenty cases for every wrongful discharge 
lawsuit.  Id. at 157. 
Other forms of alternative dispute resolution, such as arbitration, mediation, 
mediation-arbitration, dispute review boards, fact-finding, and partnering have been 
adopted to facilitate settlements and resolve lawsuits more quickly and less 
expensively.  Id.  AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, AAA Glossary of Dispute 
Resolution Terms, at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15784 (last visited Feb. 
28, 2003) (on file with author). 
 14 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53-54. 
 15 Bales phrases the issue as whether “such arbitration should be encouraged, or 
whether it should be banned as yet another employer encroachment on employees’ 
rights.”  BALES, supra note 12, at 3. 
 16 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 17 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 18 534 U.S. 279 (2002). 
 19 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
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waiving their rights to a judicial forum through arbitration. 
Finally, Part V surveys possible methods employees can utilize to 
circumvent arbitration agreements in order to get their statutory 
claims into court.  This is especially important in light of the 
dangerous reality of employers requiring employees to sign arbitration 
agreements as a condition of employment.20  Rather than mount a 
direct challenge to Gilmer, this Comment argues that courts should at 
least empower employees to refuse to sign over-inclusive arbitration 
agreements.  Using the anti-retaliation provision of the ADA as a 
model, employees should not be placed in situations where they must 
choose between waiving their statutory right to a judicial forum or 
foregoing employment.  This model will permit the continuing use 
and popularity of the arbitration agreement while ensuring that 
employees are not manipulated into signing away their civil rights. 
I.  LABOR ARBITRATION DEFINED: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Arbitration is a “simple proceeding voluntarily chosen by parties 
who want a dispute determined by an impartial judge of their own 
mutual selection, whose decision, based on the merits of the case, 
they agree in advance to accept as final and binding.”21  Arbitration is 
viewed as a highly effective dispute resolution process because it 
offers a quicker, less expensive, and less formal alternative to 
litigation.22 
Due to these benefits, arbitration first gained popularity in the 
1920s among business merchants who chose arbitration rather than 
litigation to handle contractual disputes.23  The most significant use 
of arbitration in the twentieth century, however, occurred in the 
labor context.24  Participants in the labor and employment setting 
 
 20 FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (Edward P. 
Goggin & Alan Miles Ruben eds., 5th ed. Supp. 1999) [hereinafter ELKOURI & 
ELKOURI SUPP.].  Gilmer, for instance, was required to sign the New York Stock 
Exchange’s arbitration agreement in order to work for Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp.  Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.  The use of private arbitration by employers increased 
from one percent in 1979, to ten percent in 1995, to nineteen percent in 1997.  
LEWIS L. MALTBY, PRIVATE JUSTICE: EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS, IN 
ARBITRATION NOW: OPPORTUNITIES FOR FAIRNESS, PROCESS RENEWAL AND INVIGORATION 
1, 4 (Paul H. Haagen ed., 1999). 
 21 BALES, supra note 12, at 3 (quoting Matthew N. Chappell, Arbitrate . . . and 
Avoid Stomach Ulcers, 2 ARB. MAG., Nos. 11-12, 6, 7 (1944)). 
 22 Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition of Arbitration by Those With Superior 
Bargaining Power, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 857, 857 (1999) [hereinafter Harding, 
Redefinition of Arbitration]. 
 23 BALES, supra note 12, at 5; see also Harding, Redefinition of Arbitration, supra note 
22, at 858. 
 24 See BALES, supra note 12, at 5; see also Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New 
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chose arbitration as an alternative to litigation because it offers a 
convenient and informal method of dispute resolution in which an 
employer and a union can quickly resolve disputes.25  Arbitration, 
therefore, serves as a “substitute for industrial strife” by avoiding 
costly, hostile, and unpredictable work stoppages.26  To achieve these 
desirable ends, labor arbitrators are essentially charged with the role 
of “peacemaker,”27 serving as neutral parties to interpret and apply 
employment and collective bargaining agreements.28 
The advantages of arbitration make it an attractive and viable 
forum for the resolution of disputes in the employment relationship.  
Despite its utility, however, arbitration traveled a rocky path towards 
judicial acceptance. 
II.  THE LEGAL STATUS OF ARBITRATION 
A.  The Federal Arbitration Act and Early Legal Precedent 
At common law, agreements to arbitrate were voluntary29 and 
revocable by either party.30  Courts did not favor arbitration early in 
its development, believing that “an agreement to arbitrate operated 
to divest courts of legislatively-granted jurisdiction and, therefore, was 
illegal and void.”31  Congress finally voiced its approval of arbitration 
 
Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 
1052 (1998) (indicating that the legal development of arbitration is most advanced 
in the context of collective bargaining).  Labor arbitration truly emerged at the 
forefront of labor-related dispute resolution during World War II when the National 
War Labor Board decided approximately 20,000 labor disputes.  BALES, supra note 
12, at 6. 
 25 See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 10 (Marlin 
M. Volz & Edward P. Coggin eds., 5th ed. 1997). 
 26 See id. at 7 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 
574, 578 (1960)).  In arbitration agreements, unions would explicitly surrender the 
right to strike and employers would forgo the right to resolve a dispute through 
unilateral action.  Id. 
 27 Id. at 1. 
 28 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53-54 (alluding to the traditional role of the 
labor arbitrator); see also, ARNOLD M. ZACK & RICHARD I. BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN 
NEGOTIATION AND ARBITRATION 8 (2d ed. 1995) (indicating that the objective of the 
arbitrator was to interpret and enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement). 
 29 This piece refers to arbitrtation in the voluntary sense, meaning that the 
contracting parties agree to arbitration.  See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 25, at 2 
(distinguishing voluntary arbitration from compulsory arbitration).  To contrast, 
compulsory arbitration is required by law, even if neither party desires arbitration.  
Id. at 19. 
 30 See BALES, supra note 12, at 16. 
 31 Id. 
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in 1925, when it passed the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).32  
Section 2 of the FAA renders arbitration agreements “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable.”33  Section 3 provides that a party to an 
arbitration agreement can move to stay any court proceedings34 if the 
issue is covered by an arbitration agreement, and Section 4 permits 
that party to obtain an order to compel arbitration if the other party 
refuses to honor the agreement.35  The FAA, therefore, transformed 
arbitration from a voluntary dispute resolution tool to a legally 
binding agreement backed by Congress.36 
Despite its enactment, courts did not apply the FAA until nearly 
thirty-five years later, in Wilko v. Swan.37  In Wilko, a securities 
 
 32 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2003) (original version at 43 Stat. 883 (1925)). 
 33 Section 2 of the FAA states: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or 
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement 
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of 
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2003). 
 34 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2003).  If the court is “satisfied that the issue involved in [a] suit 
or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement,” it “shall on 
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has 
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”  Id.  A “stay” is defined as 
the “temporary suspension of the regular order of proceedings in a cause, by 
direction or order of the court, usually to await the action of one of the parties in 
regard to some omitted step or some act which the court has required him to 
perform as incidental to the suit . . . .”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (6th ed. 1990). 
 35 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2003) (also allowing for judicial enforcement of arbitration 
awards). 
 36 There was also confusion as to the scope of the FAA, an issue not considered in 
this Comment.  Section 2 of the FAA defines its coverage, stating “[a] written 
provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable . . . .”  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2003).  The Supreme Court interpreted the 
“involving commerce” language as “implementing Congress’s intent ‘to exercise [its] 
commerce power to the full.’”  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 
(2001) (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1991)).  
Therefore, the FAA’s coverage is extremely broad.  A major issue, however, is 
whether employment contracts may be excluded under the FAA’s exclusionary 
clause, which states that the Act does not apply “to contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce.”  9 U.S.C. § 1 (2003).  While the Ninth Circuit took the view 
that § 1 excludes all employment contracts from the reach of the FAA, Circuit City 
Stores v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), the Supreme Court recently held that 
the exclusion is limited to “transportation workers” only.  Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. 
at 109. 
 37 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
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brokerage firm attempted to compel arbitration of a customer’s claim 
under the Securities Act of 1933.38  Rather than compel arbitration 
under the FAA, the Supreme Court declared the arbitration 
agreement invalid, holding that the right to a judicial forum for 
enforcement of the Securities Act preempted the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements under the FAA.39  The Wilko Court stated that 
the Securities Act conferred a right to recover in a court of law, and 
compelling arbitration would not adequately enable Wilko to enforce 
his rights.40  The decision in Wilko represented the first time the 
Supreme Court addressed the conflict between the FAA’s mandate to 
enforce arbitration agreements and a statutorily conferred right to a 
judicial forum.41 
The Supreme Court effectively overruled Wilko when it decided 
the “Mitsubishi Trilogy.”42  While the Wilko Court refused to apply the 
FAA to a statutory claim, the Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. held that the FAA created a presumption of 
arbitrability favoring all arbitration agreements.43  In the “Mitsubishi 
 
 38 Id. at 428-29.  The claim was brought specifically under § 12(2) of the 
Securities Act of 1933 for the alleged misrepresentation of material information 
regarding a security.  Id. 
 39 Id. at 438. 
 40 See id. at 436-37 (opining that arbitration will not ensure adequate 
enforcement of the statute, mainly because there is limited opportunity for judicial 
review of arbitrators’ decisions). 
 41 The Court phrased the clash of the FAA and the Securities Act of 1933 
accordingly: 
Two policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in this case. Congress 
has afforded participants in transactions subject to its legislative power 
an opportunity generally to secure prompt, economical and adequate 
solution of controversies through arbitration if the parties are willing to 
accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment. On the other hand, 
it has enacted the Securities Act to protect the rights of investors and 
has forbidden a waiver of any of those rights. Recognizing the 
advantages that prior agreements for arbitration may provide for the 
solution of commercial controversies, we decide that the intention of 
Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by 
holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising 
under the Act. 
Id. at 438. 
 42 The trilogy consists of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614 (1985); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); and 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 43 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626 (stating that the FAA requires courts to 
rigorously enforce arbitration agreements, and “[t]here is no reason to depart from 
these guidelines where a party bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims 
founded on statutory rights”).  The “presumption doctrine” was based on two 
assumptions: 1) an arbitration agreement does not waive substantive rights as the 
Wilko Court suggested, but rather submits those rights to an alternative forum; and 2) 
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Trilogy,” the Court enforced agreements to arbitrate statutory claims 
based on antitrust,44 securities,45 and racketeering laws.46  In Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., decided in 1985, the Court 
ruled that the FAA allowed for the arbitration of statutory claims 
unless Congress clearly indicated otherwise in the statutory 
language.47  In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., the last 
decision in the trilogy, the Court specifically overruled Wilko, holding 
that the arbitration agreement precluded a Securities Act claim from 
being heard in a judicial forum.48 
While the FAA sat virtually dormant until the “Mitsubishi 
Trilogy,” industrial corporations and unions began incorporating 
arbitration clauses into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs).49  
For the first time, the Supreme Court officially endorsed arbitration 
in the labor setting in the “Steelworkers Trilogy” of 1960.50  In all three 
cases, the Court enforced agreements to arbitrate contained in 
union-management negotiated CBAs and approved the arbitration 
process for the resolution of disputes arising under those CBAs.51  In 
the “Steelworkers Trilogy,” the Court created an “irrebuttable 
presumption” that employer-union disputes were arbitrable and 
discouraged judicial intervention in employment disputes governed 
 
arbitrators are capable of deciding statutory issues.  See BALES, supra note 12, at 24-25 
(citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626-28). 
 44 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 638. 
 45 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485. 
 46 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242. 
 47 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628. 
 48 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485. 
 49 For example, the “Steelworkers Trilogy,” discussed infra at notes 50-52 and 
accompanying text, all dealt with union-employer negotiated arbitration agreements 
in 1960. 
 50 The trilogy consists of United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 
363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 
(1960); and United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
 51 In United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), the 
Court held that an arbitrator’s decision on the merits should not be disturbed by a 
reviewing court, and that arbitrators do not have to explain their reasoning for giving 
awards.  363 U.S. at 596-98.  In Warrior & Gulf Navigation, the collective bargaining 
agreement provided for arbitration of differences relating to the meaning and 
application of provisions of the contract, but excepted from arbitration matters 
which were “strictly a function of management.”  363 U.S. at 576.  The Court showed 
its strong preference for arbitration by holding that doubts as to the scope of 
arbitration should be resolved in favor of coverage.  Id. at 582-83.  In Amercian 
Manufacturing, the circuit court upheld an employer’s refusal to arbitrate a grievance 
because the court found the complaint frivolous.  363 U.S. at 566.  The Supreme 
Court, however, compelled arbitration of the complaint, noting that it is not the job 
of courts to review the merits of the claim, but rather to enforce the terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement, which called for arbitration.  363 U.S. at 567-68. 
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by an arbitration agreement.52 
B.  The Development of Statutory Rights in the Workplace 
Aside from the National Labor Relations Act of 193553 
(“NLRA”)—which developed a regulatory scheme for union activity 
and collective bargaining—federal and state government refrained 
from intervening in labor-management relations in the early 
twentieth century.54  Accordingly, unions were the primary source of 
employees’ rights.55  Union membership peaked in the mid-1950s, as 
many employees sought the protection of unions to ensure workplace 
benefits and rights.56 
As the civil rights movement swept across America, the 
employer-employee relationship witnessed a substantial level of 
government intervention in the form of federal regulation.57  The 
 
 52 BALES, supra note 12, at 20. 
 53 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2003). 
 54 See BALES, supra note 12, at 7 (examining the history of employment legislation 
and noting that statutory protection for nonunion workers did not really begin until 
1963). 
 55 See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? 36 (1993) (stating “unions were 
able to lobby successfully for statutes prohibiting employment discrimination, 
enhancing employment health and safety, and protecting employee pension and 
welfare funds”). 
 56 In 1954, union membership constituted approximately thirty-five percent of 
the workforce.  CRAVER, supra note 55, at 34-35.  Although the absolute number of 
union members increased slightly from the mid-1950s to 1980, where it peaked at 
twenty-two million, the overall percentage of the unionized workforce declined to 
twenty percent by 1983.  Id. at 35; see also HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS (Eva E. 
Jacobs ed., 4th ed. 2000).  Union density continued to decline throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, steadily dropping to 13.2 percent in 2002, representing approximately 
sixteen million workers.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Union Members Summary, at 
www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2003) (on file with 
author). 
 57 See, e.g., the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (preventing wage discrimination on the 
basis of sex), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2002); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(discussed infra note 60), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2002); the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (preventing workplace discrimination on the basis of age), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2002); the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (setting 
guidelines for workplace safety), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2002); the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 (setting guidelines for providing equal opportunities to individuals with 
disabilities), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-961 (2002); the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (protecting employee pension benefits), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2002); 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (proscribing workplace discrimination on 
the basis of childbirth, pregnancy, and related medical conditions), 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(k) (2002); the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-8913 (2002); 
the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (prohibiting, with limited 
exceptions, the use of lie detector and polygraph tests), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (2002); 
the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (discussed supra note 3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101-213 (2002); the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (providing victims of workplace 
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Equal Pay Act of 196358 marked the beginning of a congressional 
trend towards ending workplace discrimination and creating equal 
employment opportunities for all Americans.59  The most influential 
anti-discrimination measure is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,60 
which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate with respect 
to hiring, firing, or other aspects of employment on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin.61  In addition, Congress 
enacted both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act62 (“ADEA”) 
in 1967 to combat workplace discrimination on the basis of age, and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act63 in 1990 to prohibit employment 
discrimination on the basis of a disability. 
Before 1991, Title VII claimants were not entitled to jury trials.64  
 
discrimination the right to a jury trial and for damages in the case of intentional 
discrimination), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2002); the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
(requiring employers to grant leave to their employees for family and medical 
emergencies), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2002).; See also BALES, supra note 12, at 7. 
 58 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994).  The Equal Pay Act, for instance, created the concept 
of equal pay for equal work by prohibiting wage discrimination on the basis of 
gender.  See id. 
 59 Employment legislation actually began in 1908 with the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.S. §§ 51-60 (2003), a workers’ compensation statute regulating 
the remedies available for employees of common carriers.  BALES, supra note 12, at 7.  
The Fair Labor Standards Act was passed in 1938, also prior to the civil-rights 
inspired federal regulation of the workplace.  29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2002).  Despite 
some federal intervention prior to 1963, the Equal Pay Act represented the first of 
many anti-discrimination statutes which regulate employer activities in many areas 
that were previously untouched.  BALES, supra note 12, at 7 (stating that statutory 
protection for nonunion workers began “in earnest” in 1963). 
 60 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2001); see also BALES, supra note 12, at 7 (referring to 
Title VII of the CRA of 1964 as the “watershed” event for Congress in federal 
employment legislation).  Title VII states: 
Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer–  
 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2001). 
 61 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2001). 
 62 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2001). 
 63 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2001); see also supra note 3. 
 64 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 109 (3d ed. 2001).  
Victims of racial discrimination could be heard before a jury pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
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Title VII was silent on the issue and in subsequent years, the Supreme 
Court assumed that the right to a jury trial did not exist.65  After 
deciding that Title VII needed a damages remedy, Congress passed 
the 1991 CRA.66  Under the Act, victims of discrimination under both 
Title VII and the ADA have the right to a jury trial, compensatory 
damages, and punitive damages.67 
C.  The Arbitration of Statutory Law Revisited: Post Civil Rights 
Movement 
The “Steelworkers Trilogy” placed a presumption of arbitrability 
on all claims arising under collective bargaining agreements, thus 
validating the use of arbitration for employment disputes.68  The 
modern development of statutory protections for civil rights in the 
workplace represents a new class of individual rights which exist 
regardless of whether an employee is unionized, and without regard 
to what is contained in any union-negotiated collective bargaining 
agreement.  The “Steelworkers Trilogy,” however, did not consider 
whether these rights were arbitrable. 
Two influential Supreme Court cases addressed the issue of 
whether statutory employment claims can be compelled to 
arbitration, and an analysis of both cases frames the debate that still 
exists today.69  The arbitrability of statutory claims arose for the first 
time in the employment context in Alexander v. Gardner Denver 
Company.70  Harrell Alexander, Sr., employed by Gardner-Denver Co. 
as a drill operator, believed the company fired him because he was 
black.71  After unsuccessfully pursuing a grievance for wrongful 
 
1981 (2002), but all other victims of discrimination did not have the right to a jury 
trial before 1991.  Id. 
 65 Id. at 110. 
 66 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); see also 
PERRITT, JR., supra note 64, at 110-11 (discussing the various committee reports that 
Congress relied on when drafting the amendment, which indicate the main focus of 
the act was to strengthen Title VII remedies). 
 67 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 § 1072-74 
(1991).  Section 102 states: “If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive 
damages under this section-(1) any party may demand a trial by jury.”  Id.; see also 
Karen Halverson, Arbitration and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 445, 
471-72 (1999) (breaking down in a very cohesive manner the various ways in which 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 strengthened both Title VII and the ADA). 
 68 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
 69 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 70 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 71 Id. at 43. 
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discharge in arbitration,72 Alexander brought a claim for unlawful 
discrimination under Title VII.73  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the 
claim, holding Alexander bound by the arbitral decision and 
therefore precluded from pursuing a Title VII claim in court.74 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in favor of 
Alexander.75  The Court noted that the consequence of the lower 
courts’ decisions was to “deprive [Alexander] of his statutory right to 
attempt to establish his claim in a federal court.”76  The Court held 
that Title VII provides an individual with independent statutory 
rights, enforcement of which is vested with the federal courts.77  The 
Court observed that the individual private right of action was “an 
essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII . . .”78 
and that “there can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights 
under Title VII.”79 
The Court stated that the arbitral forum was designed to resolve 
contract rights and was not appropriate for the resolution of federal 
statutory rights guaranteed by Title VII.80  Although Gardner-Denver 
addressed a Title VII claim, the Court has broadly interpreted the 
decision, applying it to other federal anti-discrimination statutes as 
well.81 
The “Mitsubishi Trilogy” cases, handed down in 1985, 1987, and 
 
 72 Id. at 39-40, 42-43.  Alexander’s grievance was based on a provision in the CBA 
stating that an employee could only be discharged for “proper cause.”  Id. at 39.  The 
arbitrator ruled against Alexander, deciding that he had been discharged for “just 
cause,” namely the production of too many defective parts.  Id. at 42. 
 73 Id. at 42. 
 74 Id. at 43. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56. 
 77 Id. at 44. 
 78 Id. at 45. 
 79 Id. at 51. 
 80 Id. at 53-54.  In reconciling this holding with the prevailing congressional 
attitude favoring arbitration, the Court said: 
the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal 
policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be 
accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his 
remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-
bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title VII. 
Id. at 59-60. 
 81 See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) 
(holding that arbitration of an employee grievance pursuant to the CBA did not 
preclude a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act); see also McDonald v. City of 
West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984) (extending Gardner-Denver to claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983). 
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1989, represented a strong shift by the court in its views concerning 
arbitration and the role of the FAA.  In the trilogy, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the FAA as creating a presumption of 
arbitrability—even when it results in statutory claims being compelled 
to an arbitral forum.82  In Gardner-Denver, however, the Court 
conclusively identified the judicial forum, and not the arbitration 
process, as the appropriate forum for the resolution of statutory 
employment discrimination claims.83  It was, thus, unclear whether 
the Supreme Court effectively carved out its own exception to the 
FAA for statutory employment claims. 
The Supreme Court resolved its apparent conflict in the 1991 
landmark decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.84  Gilmer, 
fired at age sixty-two, filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging he had 
been unlawfully discharged based on his age in violation of the 
ADEA.85  In response, Interstate filed a motion to compel 
arbitration.86  Prior to beginning employment, Interstate required 
Gilmer to register as a securities representative with several stock 
exchanges.87  Importantly, the New York Stock Exchange’s (“NYSE”) 
application required Gilmer to arbitrate “any dispute, claim, or 
controversy” arising out of his employment with Interstate.88  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, finding 
“nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying purposes of the 
ADEA indicating a congressional intent to preclude enforcement of 
arbitration agreements,” dismissed Gilmer’s suit in favor of 
arbitration.89 
 
 82 See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. 
 83 See Robert J. Lewton, Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration Requirements a Viable 
Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory Employment Discriminations 
Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991, 1010 (1996) (stating that Gardner-Denver and its progeny 
stand for the proposition “that binding arbitration is inferior to the judicial process 
for resolving statutory employment discrimination claims”); see also Gardner-Denver, 
415 U.S. at 56 (stating that arbitration is an “inappropriate forum for the final 
resolution of rights created by Title VII”). 
 84 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 85 Id. at 23-24. 
 86 Id. at 24. 
 87 Id. at 23. 
 88 Id.  To clarify the connection between the NYSE arbitration agreement and 
how it applied to Gilmer’s relationship with Interstate, NYSE Rule 347 is instructive.  
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.  The Rule required arbitration of “any controversy between a 
registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the 
employment or termination of employment of such registered representative.”  Id. 
 89 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1990).  
The circuit decision reversed the district court, which originally denied the motion 
to compel arbitration in reliance on Gardner-Denver, holding that ADEA claimants 
cannot waive a judicial forum.  Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24. 
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The Supreme Court affirmed, extending the “presumption of 
arbitrability” announced in the “Mitsubishi Trilogy” to include 
statutory employment discrimination claims, specifically ADEA 
claims.90  This decision represented the first time the Supreme Court 
“held that a statutory civil rights claim can be subjected to mandatory 
arbitration.”91 
The Gilmer decision departs from the Gardner-Denver policy 
against enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements as applied to 
statutory claims.  The Court, however, did not expressly overrule 
Gardner-Denver.92  The Court instead distinguished the case because 
Gardner-Denver involved a collective bargaining agreement, while 
Gilmer enforced an arbitration clause in an individual employment 
contract.93  In light of that important difference, Gilmer sent a clear 
message to employers that arbitration agreements in individual 
employment contracts will result in the arbitration of all claims, even 
those based on federal statutes. 
Gilmer indicates that the Court is comfortable with the resolution 
of statutory claims in the arbitral forum.94  A brief analysis of the 
inner-workings of the arbitral process, however, reveals that 
arbitration may not be well-suited to carry out statutory law in a fair 
manner. 
III.  THE ARBITRATION PROCESS: AN APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS? 
The numerous benefits of the arbitral process, such as quicker 
resolution of disputes at lower costs, validate the congressional policy 
embodied in the FAA favoring arbitration as a legitimate means of 
alternative dispute resolution.95   
 
 90 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27. 
 91 See Green, supra note 12, at 173. 
 92 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35 (distinguishing the cases on various grounds). 
 93 Id. at 35.  Apparently, the Gilmer Court found merit in the Gardner-Denver 
Court’s concern that unionized claimants are represented by their union 
representatives in arbitration proceedings, which may result in the pursuit of union 
interests rather than vindicating the interests of the individual employee.  Id. 
Furthermore, Gilmer distinguished the cases because Gardner-Denver was not 
decided under the FAA.  Id.; see also Theodore St. Antoine, The Changing Role of Labor 
Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 87 (2001). 
 94 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party 
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp., 473 U.S. at 628). 
 95 Among the most important is the speed and efficiency with which arbitration is 
conducted, especially when compared to the slow progression of employment 
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Nevertheless, despite the advantages of arbitration, it may come 
at too substantial a cost to employees.96  Courts continue to debate 
the adequacy of the arbitration process for the resolution of statutory 
employment claims.97  The Gardner-Denver Court, for example, voiced 
its skepticism of arbitration when it stated that “[a]rbitral procedures, 
while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make 
arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final 
resolution of rights created by Title VII.”98  The Gilmer Court 
responded, however, by stating “such generalized attacks on 
arbitration” are “far out of step with our current strong endorsement 
of [arbitration].”99  Gilmer, therefore, rejected the challenges “as 
insufficient to preclude arbitration of statutory claims.”100  The Gilmer 
 
disputes through the overburdened court systems.  ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 
25, at 10-13.  According to Elkouri & Elkouri, arbitration can resolve cases in just a 
few days.  Id. at 13.  A statistical report from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service, however, reveals that the average length of time between the filing of a 
grievance and an arbitrator’s decision in 1994 was 342.88 days.  Id. at 13 n.48. 
Arbitration is also inexpensive, a quality that provides a great benefit to 
employees who may not be able to afford litigation or attract counsel.  See BALES, 
supra note 12, at 9, 157, 169 (discussing various disincentives attorneys face when 
deciding to represent employees).  The quick and informal arbitral process can 
require substantially less time and money than litigation, thus providing employees 
access to attorneys that would otherwise not take the case.  Id. at 9; see also Ronald 
Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case 
Against Union Waiver of the Individual Worker’s Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 
EMORY L.J. 135, 203 (2000) (suggesting that, despite the danger of waiving one’s 
right to a judicial forum, there are benefits to arbitration that may lead to employees 
opting to sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements). 
Furthermore, arbitration is not an adversarial process, but rather an informal 
one that encourages the maintenance of the current employment relationship 
between the parties.  See BALES, supra note 12, at 9-10; see also Patrick A. Lynd, Recent 
Developments Regarding Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes, 77 OR. L. 
REV. 287, 288 (1998) (identifying as benefits of arbitration the ability to circumvent 
the backlog of the courts and keep costs such as attorney fees and discovery 
expenditures to a minimum). 
 96 Haagen, supra note 24, at 1053. 
 97 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-58; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32. 
 98 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56.  The Court based its conclusion on the 
inadequacies between the judicial and arbitral forum.  Id. at 57-58.  Specifically, the 
Court voiced its concern for the lack of discovery in arbitration, the possibility of 
biased arbitration panels, the incompleteness of the record in arbitration 
proceedings, the inapplicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Evidence, the limited grounds for appeal, the absence of written opinions, and the 
unavailability of broad equitable relief.  Id. 
 99 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Rodriquez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481 (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 100 Id.  The Court stated that “procedural inadequacies . . . [are] best left for 
resolution in specific cases.”  Id. at 33 (emphasis added).  By rejecting “generalized 
attacks” on arbitration, the Gilmer Court inferred that individualized claims of 
inadequacy in the arbitration process could be addressed should future 
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court’s dismissal of Gardner-Denver’s apprehensions, however, fails to 
allay the specific concerns surrounding the arbitration process as an 
appropriate forum for employees’ statutory claims.  Gilmer aside, a 
closer analysis reveals important differences between the judicial and 
arbitral forums, many of which weigh heavily against employee 
interests.101 
One of the Supreme Court’s principal concerns in Gardner-
Denver was that arbitrators may lack the competency that courts have 
to understand and apply statutory law.102  Many arbitrators are not 
judges, or even lawyers, and although they may be experts in a given 
business area, arbitrators lack the requisite training to handle 
statutory claims.103  Furthermore, arbitrators are not bound by the 
rules of stare decisis, which may result in the overwhelming 
interjection of an arbitrator’s business judgment into a purely legal 
decision.104 
Another concern regarding the arbitration process is that there 
 
circumstances arise.  See BALES, supra note 12, at 127-28.  Therefore, it seems that the 
Gilmer Court implicitly acknowledged that inadequacies do exist in the arbitration of 
statutory employment rights.  Id. at 128. 
 101 See infra notes 102-28 and accompanying text.  The statistics discussed supra 
note 20, which reveal a nine percent increase in the use of arbitration from 1995-
1997, suggest that employers may perceive arbitration as being a much more 
favorable forum for the resolution of statutory claims.  Furthermore, one 
commentator even characterizes the increase in arbitration as a “stampede” by 
employers in reaction to the Gilmer holding.  William M. Howard, Arbitrating 
Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 
DRAKE L. REV. 255, 255 (1994). 
 102 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-58 (1974); see also Moore, 
supra note 12, at 1589-90 (citing a study indicating that sixteen percent of arbitrators 
never read a judicial opinion involving a Title VII claim; forty percent did not read 
labor advance sheets on new Title VII developments; and of those arbitrators who fit 
both categories, fifty percent nevertheless felt competent to preside over 
employment discrimination claims).  History supports this concern, as arbitrators 
traditionally presided over contract disputes and collective bargaining agreements.  
See ZACK & BLOCH, supra note 28, at 39, 97. 
 103 See ZACK & BLOCH, supra note 28, at 106-07. 
 104 See Miriam A. Cherry, Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration: Using Title VII Disparate Impact 
Analysis to Invalidate Employment Contracts That Discriminate, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 
267, 304 (1998).  Aside from the questionable qualifications of arbitrators, 
commentators also question the selection procedures.  See BALES, supra note 12, at 
126-30; ELKOURI & ELKOURI SUPP., supra note 20, at 3.  For example, employers will 
sometimes both select and pay an arbitrator.  Id. (citing to a 1997 statement made by 
the Chairman of the NLRB in which he questioned why the NLRB should be 
deferential to an arbitral system that is set up and paid for by employers).  Also, 
employers are often repeat players in the arbitration process, so there may exist an 
institutional bias for arbitrators to issue employer-friendly decisions.  See Lisa B. 
Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y 
J. 189 (1997) (discussing the “repeat player effect” in arbitration). 
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is no uniform law requiring arbitrators to issue written opinions.105  
Professor Leona Green points out two major problems that arise 
when arbitrators do not provide opinions.106  First, the absence of 
opinions hinders any development of certainty and precedent.107  
Without an arbitrator’s reasoning, neither employers nor employees 
receive guidance as to what behavior is actionable.108  Similarly, other 
arbitrators have no precedent to rely upon when deciding cases, 
undoubtedly leading to inconsistent results.109 
Second, Professor Green posits that the absence of written 
opinions makes judicial review nearly impossible.110  Arbitration 
awards can be vacated for a “manifest disregard of the law,” but 
courts have difficulty deciding whether an arbitrator exercised such 
disregard without a written opinion to review.111  Furthermore, 
arbitrators can avoid being held accountable for their decisions 
because there are no written opinions to scrutinize.112 
Although the absence of written opinions serves as one barrier 
 
 105 See Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 57-58 (pointing out that a major drawback of 
arbitration is that arbitrators are not required to issue written opinions); see also 
Hayford, supra note 12, at 445 (“[W]hen arbitrators do not provide substantive 
written awards revealing their mode of decision, judicial vacation of the award is 
virtually precluded.”); Moore, supra note 12, at 1576; Green, supra note 12, at 202-03 
(acknowledging the potential problems derived from the absence of written opinions 
of arbitrator’s decisions). 
 106 See Green, supra note 12, at 202-03 (assessing the potential pitfalls of the 
absence of written opinions). 
 107 Id. at 202. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id.  Gilmer argued that the lack of a written opinion would disadvantage him 
in the exercise of his statutory rights.  Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.  The Court dismissed 
this contention by pointing to the NYSE rules which required arbitration awards to 
be in writing.  Id.  Professor Bales astutely observes, however, that the Gilmer Court 
erred in this respect, as the NYSE rules only required written awards which are to be 
distinguished from written opinions.  BALES, supra note 12, at 133.  Therefore, 
Professor Bales concludes that the Court used a mistaken analysis to refute Gilmer’s 
argument.  Id. 
 110 Green, supra note 12, at 203. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Moore, supra note 12, at 1594.  Additionally, employers may also avoid public 
accountability keeping the potentially damaging publicity of discriminatory behavior 
below the public radar.  See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31; see also Moore, supra note 12, at 
1594.  Green observes that civil rights statutes thrive on social vindication, but the 
private nature of arbitration prevents such vindication from occurring.  Green, supra 
note 12, at 204.  Therefore, Green concludes that avoiding the negative publicity of a 
civil rights dispute is an essential feature of arbitration for employers whose 
businesses are in competitive markets and rely heavily on goodwill.  Id; see also Sarah 
Johnston, Alternative Dispute Resolution Symposium: Current Public Law and Policy Issues 
in ADR: ADR in the Employment Discrimination Context: Friend or Foe to Claimants, 22 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y, 335, 379 (2001). 
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to judicial review of an 
arbitrator’s decision in a civil rights case,113 a much larger 
concern is the extremely narrow grounds on which losing parties may 
appeal arbitration decisions.  The FAA, unsurprisingly given its 
arbitration-friendly genesis, only allows a court to vacate or modify an 
arbitral award under very limited circumstances.114  Appeals are not 
allowed, however, when an arbitrator misinterprets the law, fails to 
follow stare decisis, or is confronted with a novel legal issue.115 
There is a common law ground for vacatur of arbitral decisions, 
known as the “manifest disregard of the law” standard,116 which has 
been termed “a judicially-created addition to the statutory grounds 
set forth in the FAA.”117  According to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, a decision should be overturned 
under the “manifest disregard” standard when the arbitrator 
“appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but 
decided to ignore it or pay no attention to it.”118  Lower courts have 
consistently identified “manifest disregard” as a severely limited 
doctrine,119 and case law reveals that very few arbitration awards have 
ever been overturned based on this standard.120  Accordingly, a 
 
 113 See Green, supra note 12, at 202-03. 
 114 See Monica J. Washington, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: 
Judicial Review Without Judicial Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 844, 850 (1999) (listing 
and analyzing the grounds for judicial review under the FAA).  Under the FAA, 
modification of an arbitral award is only available: (1) when the award was “procured 
by corruption, fraud, or undue means”; (2) when evidence exists of “partiality or 
corruption in the arbitrators”; (3) when evidence of specific misconduct by the 
arbitrators exists; or (4) when “the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”  9 U.S.C. § 
10(a) (2002). 
 115 Washington, supra note 114, at 850. 
 116 The Supreme Court first identified the standard in dicta in Wilko v. Swan, 
discussed supra Part II.A.  See Harding, Redefinition of Arbitration, supra note 22, at 926 
(stating that the manifest disregard of the law standard finds its origin in Wilko); 
Washington, supra note 114, at 853-54. 
 117 BALES, supra note 12, at 136; see also Washington, supra note 114, at 853-54 
(pointing out the Wilko decision’s “manifest disregard for the law” standard came 
twenty-seven years after the passage of the FAA). 
 118 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 
1986); see also Washington, supra note 114, at 853-55 (discussing the manifest 
disregard standard and its limits). 
 119 In a 1997 Policy Statement regarding mandatory arbitration, the EEOC cited a 
report identifying the “manifest disregard” standard as a “virtually insurmountable” 
hurdle.  See THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC Notice No. 
915.002, July 10, 1997, at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html (last visited Mar. 
5, 2003) (on file with author). 
 120 In his 1997 book, Professor Bales states that no arbitration award had ever been 
overturned based on the “manifest disregard” standard.  BALES, supra note 12, at 136.  
Since Professor Bales’s observation, the Second Circuit vacated an arbitration award 
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reviewing court cannot overturn or modify an arbitral award where 
the arbitrator merely misinterpreted, misapplied, or misunderstood 
clear principles of law.121 
Commentators also voice concerns about the adequacy of 
arbitration for statutory claims because of the limited opportunity for 
discovery in arbitration.122  The speed and efficiency of the arbitration 
process often results in abbreviated periods of discovery,123 yet full 
discovery is often needed to pursue claims under Title VII and other 
anti-discrimination statutes.124  Additionally, employees are 
disadvantaged by a limited opportunity for discovery because the 
relevant information and documentation sought by the employee in 
the discovery process is, quite often, already in the hands of the 
employers.125  In the court system, victims of discrimination may 
compel the production of such information through the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.126  In the arbitral forum, however, 
 
denying an ADEA claim based on the “manifest disregard” standard.  Halligan v. 
Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998).  One commentator heavily 
criticized the decision as being a departure from precedent and argued that the 
decision was really overturned because the court disagreed with the arbitrator’s 
application of the evidence.  See Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: 
Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 478-79 (1998). 
 121 See U.S. Energy Corp. v. Nukem Inc., Nos. 96-1532 & 97-1332, 1998 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 26878, at *7-8 (10th Cir. Oct. 22, 1998) (stating “[t]he review of an 
arbitrator’s award is among the narrowest known to law,” and indicating that an 
arbitrator’s’ errors or misunderstanding of the law is not sufficient to overturn an 
award). 
 122 See Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1, 23 (1999); Green, supra note 12, at 201. 
 123 Bales, supra note 123, at 23. 
 124 See Green, supra note 12, at 201(explaining that access to information is 
especially important today because discrimination is much subtler than in the past; 
more information is therefore needed to prove the existence of discrimination).  For 
example, pursuit of a disparate impact claim under Title VII often requires a 
complainant to provide statistical analysis based on workplace demographics; lack of 
access to this crucial information could potentially defeat an employees’ claim.  See 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (defining a disparate impact 
claim as a theory of discrimination that makes it unlawful for an employer to utilize 
an employment practice—although facially neutral with no intention to 
discriminate—that has a significantly adverse impact on a protected group of 
employees).  Therefore, “[m]ore restrictive discovery may leave a plaintiff with a 
meritorious claim unable to prove it.”  Haagen, supra note 24, at 1053. 
 125 See Green, supra note 12, at 220 (explaining that employees need the 
procedural safeguards offered in court to conduct discovery because employers 
usually control the information relevant to employment-related disputes). 
 126 The rules of discovery safeguard the parties in the information sharing process.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.  Main opponents to the mandatory arbitration of statutory 
claims, such as the EEOC and NLRB, are significantly concerned with losing the 
protection of the rules.  See ELKOURI & ELKOURI SUPP., supra note 20, at 3. 
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employees are not guaranteed the fairness ensured by the Federal 
Rules.127  Accordingly, abbreviated and informal discovery can be 
dangerously unfair to employees. 
Generally, parties to an agreement choose arbitration because it 
is less expensive and often timelier than court proceedings.128  The 
preceding analysis, however, suggests that arbitration may not be 
appropriate when important civil rights statutes are at stake.  
Although the informality of the arbitral forum aids the peaceful 
collective bargaining process between unions and management, that 
same informality can undermine important Congressional 
protections for employees’ individual rights. 
IV.  POST-GILMER DECISIONS AND THE RESTORATION OF EMPLOYEE 
RIGHTS 
Despite the pro-arbitration climate, modern jurisprudence 
indicates that the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in 
employment contracts may be susceptible to attack.  The focus of this 
Comment now turns toward two potentially influential Supreme 
Court rulings.129 
A.  Challenging the Arbitration Clause Itself 
In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,130 the Untied States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court 
ruling and dismissed an ADA claim, compelling the parties to 
arbitrate pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the collective 
bargaining agreement.131  When the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to review the case, the circumstances seemed ripe for the Court to 
resolve the existing conflict between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer.132  
 
 127 See BALES, supra note 12, at 151 (stating “the absence of formal rules may favor 
the employer because, as with discovery, procedural rules help level the playing 
field”). 
 128 Id. at 10; see also Harding, Redefinition of Arbitration, supra note 22, at 857. 
 129 Subsection A analyzes the decision in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 
525 U.S. 70 (1998), and subsection B addresses the Supreme Court’s holding in 
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). 
 130 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
 131 Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., No. 96-2850, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 
19299, at *5-6 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997). 
 132 Arguments on both sides addressed the two cases, inviting the Court to realign 
the status of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.  Wright, 525 U.S. at 77.  Wright 
argued for the reaffirmation of Gardner-Denver, which would preclude his ADA claim 
from being compelled to arbitration; in contrast, the respondent argued that Gilmer 
has, over time, effectively nullified Gardner-Denver.  Id.; see also Rosetta E. Ellis, 
Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Case Against 
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Although acknowledging that “[t]here is obviously some tension 
between these two lines of cases,”133 the Court found it “unnecessary 
to resolve the question of the validity of a union-negotiated waiver.”134 
Instead, the Wright Court scrutinized the language of the 
arbitration agreement and refused to interpret an arbitration clause 
as mandating arbitration of a statutorily protected right unless the 
language included a “clear and unmistakable” waiver.135  Regardless of 
the legality of a prospective waiver of a judicial forum for a civil rights 
claim, the Court ruled that, at the very least, such a waiver should be 
explicitly established.136  In this case, the arbitration clause contained 
in the CBA, which covered “all matters affecting wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment,” did not explicitly 
include Wright’s federal statutory employment discrimination 
claim.137  Accordingly, a unanimous Court vacated the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision.138 
Wright is significant for a variety of reasons.  It would have been 
easy for the Wright Court to cite developing circuit court precedent139 
and refuse to uphold any union waiver of individual rights.  The 
Court’s failure to do so, however, suggests that the Court is hesitant 
to adopt the circuits’ view, thus shrouding those opinions in doubt.140  
 
Barring Statutory Discrimination Claims From Federal Court Jurisdiction, 86 VA. L. REV. 307, 
319 (2000) (summarizing the parties’ arguments on appeal).  The Court did, in fact, 
question whether Gardner-Denver survived Gilmer.  Wright, 525 U.S. at 79-81.  The 
Court remained neutral, however, and was hesitant to adopt or overrule either 
decision.  Id. 
 133 Wright, 525 U.S. at 76. 
 134 Id. at 77.  As to reconciling the two decisions, the Court observed that Gilmer’s 
presumption of arbitrability is strong, but at the same time, the presumption should 
only apply to an arbitrator’s interpretation of the terms of the CBA.  Id. at 79. 
 135 Id. at 80. 
 136 Id. at 79-80. 
 137 Id. at 81.  The Court indicated that to satisfy the clear and unmistakable 
standard, it was looking for specific incorporation of statutory antidiscrimination 
claims in the arbitration clause.  Id. at 80. 
 138 Id. at 82. 
 139 Quite a few circuits take the position that an individual’s statutory rights may 
not be waived through a CBA.  See Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., 220 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 
2000); Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1999); Air Line Pilots 
Ass’n, Int’l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1999), judgment 
reinstated en banc, 211 F.3d 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Albertson’s, Inc. v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union, 157 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
809 (1999); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 522 (11th Cir. 
1997); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1454 (10th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. 
Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Varner v. Nat’l Super Markts., Inc., 
94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 140 By ignoring the Gilmer and Gardner-Denver conflict and adding a new “clear and 
unmistakable” standard, the Court contributed to, rather than alleviated, the 
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Moreover, the Wright decision relies partly on the court’s recognition 
of the importance of the right to a judicial forum, a right specifically 
discounted in Gilmer.141  By scrutinizing the language of arbitration 
agreements, the Court is acknowledging the importance of 
employees’ right to a judicial forum by protecting against unknowing 
or unclear waivers.  Finally, Wright creates a new avenue of attack for 
employees seeking access to a judicial forum. 
The Court, however, significantly limited the application of the 
“clear and unmistakable” standard by scrutinizing only those 
arbitration clauses contained in CBAs, and not individual 
employment contracts.142  To be more effective, courts should extend 
the holding to situations involving individual employees.  Individual 
employees need the protection offered by the “clear and 
unmistakable” standard because of their lack of bargaining power.  
To safeguard employees from forcibly signing an arbitration 
agreement as a condition of employment, at a minimum courts 
should require the waiver of substantive rights to be readily apparent 
to the employee.  Accordingly, the potential force and impact of 
Wright will not be felt until a future court extends the “clear and 
unmistakable” principle to a non-unionized employee. 
 
B.  The EEOC and the Circumvention of Mandatory Arbitration 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is 
the administrative body responsible for the enforcement of Title VII, 
 
continuing confusion.  See Ellis, supra note 132, at 320-21 (stating that Wright failed to 
address the Gilmer-Gardner-Denver ambiguities and left behind “an equally ambiguous 
‘clear and unmistakable’ standard.”). 
 141 Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.  Another potential reason for the adoption of the “clear 
and unmistakable” standard is to prevent implicit or hidden presentation of an 
arbitration clause to a union negotiator, who would not expect to have the authority 
to bargain away employees’ substantive rights.  See John E. Taylor, Helping Those Who 
Help Themselves: The Fourth Circuit’s Treatment of Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory 
Employment Discrimination Claims in Brown v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc. and EEOC v. 
Waffle House, Inc., 79 N.C. L. REV. 239, 291 (2000). 
Another proffered reason supporting the Court’s position is the importance of 
union members clearly understanding the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreements for which they vote.  Id. at 292.  Read collectively, the “clear and 
unmistakable” standard will avoid a situation where “important employee rights 
might be waived without the awareness of either union negotiators or individual 
employees.”  Id. 
 142 Justice Scalia clearly stated that the “clear and unmistakable” standard was not 
applicable in a Gilmer setting, which did not involve a collective bargaining 
agreement but rather an individual employment contract.  Wright, 525 U.S. at 80-81. 
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the ADA, and the ADEA.143  If the EEOC finds that reasonable cause144 
exists to believe that discrimination occurred, it may elect to pursue 
the claim in federal court.145  The interplay between EEOC-led suits 
on behalf of aggrieved employees and mandatory arbitration 
agreements has placed the courts in a unique position.  Questions 
exist as to how an arbitration agreement affects the EEOC’s 
responsibilities to an individual employee.146  In EEOC v. Waffle House, 
Inc.,147 the Supreme Court sought to resolve the confusion.148 
 
 143 The EEOC was created by statutory authority under Title VII and is codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994).  The EEOC is also the enforcing body of the ADA, 42 
U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2003) (indicating that the powers, remedies, and procedures of 
the ADA are the same as those of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 
(2003)).  The EEOC also enforces the Equal Pay Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2003). 
To preserve the right to sue under the Act, aggrieved employees must file a 
complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.  42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(e)(1) (2003).  If the EEOC finds that the charge is without merit, it will 
close the matter.  See THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC 
Enforcement Activities, at www.eeoc.gov/enforce.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2002) (on 
file with author).  If, however, it determines that there is reasonable cause to believe 
that the discrimination took place, it will attempt to conciliate the charge through a 
voluntary resolution between the parties.  Id. 
The EEOC will issue a “right to sue” letter if it believes there is a valid claim but 
chooses not to pursue the claim.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2003).  In 2000, the 
EEOC filed a mere 291 direct suits out of the 79,896 charges it received.  See EEOC 
Homepage, at www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2002) (on file 
with author). Therefore, of the approximately 79,600 individuals whose claims did 
not get picked up by the EEOC, all those whose claims had merit received right to 
sue letters.  Id. 
 144 After an investigation, if the EEOC determines that “there is reasonable cause 
to believe that the charge is true,” the EEOC must use “informal methods of 
conference, conciliation, and persuasion” to end the unlawful employment practice.  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2003).  If the EEOC’s conciliation efforts are unsuccessful 
after 30 days, it may file a civil action in federal district court.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) 
(2003). 
 145 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2002).  As originally enacted, the EEOC had only 
investigative powers.  See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 286 (2002).  To 
give the EEOC teeth and to ensure better compliance with the statute, Congress 
amended Title VII in 1972 and gave the EEOC the right to pursue claims in federal 
court in its own name.  Id. 
 146 The circuits are split on the issue of damages.  In EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & 
Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 460 (6th Cir. 1999), the Sixth Circuit allowed the EEOC to 
bring an action for injunctive relief, back pay, and damages—despite the existence of 
an arbitration agreement.  Both the Second and Eighth Circuits, however, limit the 
EEOC to the pursuit of injunctive relief only, holding that monetary relief on behalf 
of the employee was precluded by the arbitration agreement.  See EEOC v. Kidder, 
Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and 
Smith, Inc. v. Nixon, 210 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 958 
(2000). 
 147 534 U.S. 279 (2002). 
 148 For a more detailed description about the circuit split, see Martin H. Malin, 
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Believing that Waffle House employee Baker was wrongfully 
discharged in violation of the ADA,149 the EEOC filed suit seeking 
both broad injunctive relief against discriminatory employment 
practices and appropriate relief for Baker.150  In response, Waffle 
House moved to compel arbitration pursuant to Baker’s signed 
application form which contained an arbitration clause.151  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the 
EEOC may seek injunctive relief in the federal forum, but that the 
FAA policy favoring arbitration outweighs the EEOC’s right to seek 
victim-specific relief on behalf of Baker.152 
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit 
and ruled that the existence of a mandatory arbitration agreement 
did not limit the remedies available to the EEOC.153  The Court stated 
that the EEOC has the statutory authority to request compensatory 
 
Privatizing Justice—But By How Much?  Questions Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 589, 622-24 (2001). 
 149 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2003), discussed supra Part II.C. 
 150 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 807 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 534 U.S. 
279 (2002).  Specifically, the EEOC sought injunctive relief “to eradicate the effects 
of [Waffle House’s] past and present unlawful employment practices.”  Waffle House, 
534 U.S. at 283.  To make Baker whole, the EEOC requested back pay, 
reinstatement, compensatory damages, and punitive damages for what the EEOC 
termed as malicious and reckless conduct.  Id. at 284. 
 151 Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 807.  The relevant provision required binding 
arbitration for “any dispute or claim concerning Applicant’s employment with Waffle 
House, Inc., or the terms, conditions, or benefits of such employment.”  Id. 
 152 Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812.  The district court denied Waffle House’s 
motion, ruling that the agreement was invalid because Baker signed the application 
at a different Waffle House location.  Id. at 808.  In disagreeing with the district 
court, the circuit court engaged in somewhat of a balancing act.  Id. at 811-12.  The 
court ruled that Congress invested in the EEOC independent authority to enforce 
the ADA’s ban on discrimination, and therefore its power to bring suit cannot be 
impaired by an individual’s agreement to arbitrate.  Id. (“[T]he EEOC, when acting 
in its public role, is not bound by private arbitration agreements.”).  The court also 
observed, however, that the role of the EEOC in vindicating individual interests 
“implicates the competing federal policy” of the FAA, and thus permitting the 
pursuit of Baker’s interests “would significantly trample this strong policy.”  Id. at 
812. 
 153 Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 297-98.  In reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Court also 
overturned the decisions of the Second Circuit in EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 
F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998), and the Eighth Circuit in Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and 
Smith, Inc. v. Nixon, 210 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 958 (2000).  
The Court opined that the circuit court’s “compromise solution . . . turns what is 
effectively a forum selection clause into a waiver of a nonparty’s statutory remedies.”  
Id. at 295.  Justice Stevens found the balancing act unworkable because it would 
deprive the EEOC of the right to pursue punitive damages.  Id. at 294-95.  The Justice 
determined that punitive damages serve both the victim’s interests and the public’s 
interest because punitive damages often act as the greatest deterrent against future 
unlawful behavior.  Id. 
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and punitive damages, and there is no language suggesting that the 
presence of an employee arbitration agreement “materially changes” 
the EEOC’s statutory function or rights.154  The Court concluded that 
the EEOC has independent statutory authority, is “the master of its 
own case,” and should, therefore, be unaffected by an arbitration 
agreement to which it is not a party.155  Accordingly, the EEOC has 
the discretion to pursue both injunctive and victim-specific relief 
regardless of whether employees themselves may be precluded from 
seeking such relief.156 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, suggests that the majority opinion is 
unprincipled and lacks statutory support.157  The Justice disagrees 
“that the EEOC may do on behalf of an employee that which an 
employee has agreed not to do for himself.”158  Justice Thomas 
believes that allowing an employee “two bites at the apple—one in 
arbitration and one in litigation conducted by the EEOC”159 is 
inappropriate and in contravention of the FAA.160  The Justice 
observes that the end result of the majority’s opinion is to discourage 
the use of arbitration agreements, therefore contradicting the intent 
of Congress embodied in the pro-arbitration FAA.161 
Despite the dissenters, the Supreme Court in Waffle House 
provides another limited avenue for employees with discrimination 
claims to avoid being compelled to arbitrate.  While Wright and Waffle 
House evidence a growing concern among members of the Supreme 
 
 154 Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 288. 
 155 Id. at 291.  In its statutory analysis, the Court also paid cursory attention to the 
FAA.  Id. at 288-89.  Justice Stevens acknowledged the liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration, but also stated that the FAA does not mention its applicability to the 
EEOC: “[t]he FAA does not mention enforcement by public agencies; it ensures the 
enforceability of private agreements to arbitrate, but otherwise does not purport to 
place any restriction on a nonparty’s choice of a judicial forum.”  Id. at 289. 
 156 The Court did note that principals of res judicata apply, so the EEOC’s 
remedies may be limited by the out-of-court activity by the employee, such as the 
acceptance of an arbitration settlement.  Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 296-97.  In the 
instant situation, however, Baker immediately filed with the EEOC and took no 
individual steps to secure vindication.  Id. at 297. 
 157 Throughout his dissent, Justice Thomas attacks both the majority’s reasoning 
and the practicality of the decision.  Id. at 298-315 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  As to the 
reasoning, he finds an “utter lack of statutory support for the Court’s holding.”  Id. at 
315 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  As to the practicality, Justice Thomas laments that the 
decision puts the Court on a slippery slope towards effectively invalidating arbitration 
agreements signed by employees.  Id. at 311-12 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 158 Id. at 298 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 159 Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 310 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 160 Id. at 308 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 161 Id. at 312 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Court, the modern landscape of mandatory arbitration has little 
room for change.  For this reason, it is important to propose and 
examine other potential developments with the hope that employees 
get their “bite at the apple.” 
V.  EMPOWERING EMPLOYEES TO PRESERVE THEIR RIGHTS 
The Supreme Court has taken few steps to alleviate the tension 
between the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy and the concern for proper 
enforcement of employment anti-discrimination statutes.  The Wright 
decision safeguards employees from hidden and/or vague arbitration 
agreements, ensuring that such agreements are “clear and 
unmistakable.”162  Although the “clear and unmistakable” standard is 
a step in the right direction, it is limited to the labor union context 
and has yet to be applied to individual employment contracts.163 
In Waffle House, the Court ruled that the EEOC can pursue 
victim-specific relief on behalf of employees who have otherwise 
waived the right to a judicial forum through an arbitration 
agreement.164  The Waffle House decision, however, has very little 
practical significance because of the EEOC’s limited resources.165  
Thus, even though Waffle House establishes an opportunity for an 
employee to circumvent an arbitration agreement, that opportunity is 
not readily available. 
Other avenues exist that may also help employees get their “bite 
at the apple.”  The FAA states that an arbitration clause is valid and 
enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”166  Based on this language, courts may 
scrutinize arbitration clauses using common law contract principles 
without offending the purpose of the FAA.  One such principle is the 
doctrine of unconscionability.167 
 
 162 See supra notes 130-142 and accompanying text. 
 163 Wright, 525 U.S. at 80-81.  For an example of the continuing vitality of the 
Wright distinction between collective bargaining agreements and individual 
employment contracts, see Williams v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758, 763 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 164 See supra notes 147-161 and accompanying text. 
 165 Statistics show that in 2000, the EEOC filed just 290 direct suits—less than one 
percent of the 79,896 charges it received.  THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1992 through FY 2002, at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2003) (on file with 
author); see also THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Charge 
Statistics FY 1992 through FY 2002, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2003) (on file with author). 
 166 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2003). 
 167 The doctrine of unconscionability varies by state, but “has generally been 
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the 
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The most notable example of the unconscionability rationale 
comes from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in Circuit City Stores v. Adams.168  The court determined that Circuit 
City’s arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable because it 
was a form contract, was drafted by the party with superior bargaining 
power, and was presented to prospective employees on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.169  The court also found the agreement substantively 
unconscionable for the following reasons: (1) the agreement was not 
bilateral;170 (2) the agreement limited the relief available to aggrieved 
employees that was otherwise available under the state discrimination 
statutes; and (3) the arbitration clause required Adams to split the 
arbitration fees with Circuit City.171  Circuit City shows that courts may 
closely scrutinize arbitration agreements for terms that unfairly skew 
arbitration in favor of the employer.172 
Courts are responsible for determining whether or not a specific 
 
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other 
party.”  CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.15 (2002). 
 168 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002).  As an 
employment policy, Circuit City requires prospective applicants sign its Dispute 
Resolution Agreement in order to apply for a job.  Id. at 891.  Adams’ state sexual 
harassment claims were dismissed pursuant to the agreement, which Adams 
subsequently challenged as an unconscionable contract of adhesion.  Id. at 891-92.  
The Ninth Circuit concluded that “Circuit City has devised an arbitration agreement 
that functions as a thumb on Circuit City’s side of the scale . . . such an arrangement 
is unconscionable under California law.”  Id. at 892. 
For a similar case finding an arbitration agreement unconscionable, see Hooters 
of Am. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D.S.C. 1998), aff’d, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); 
see also Johnston, supra note 112, at 363-66 (analyzing Hooters). 
 169 Circuit City, 279 F.3d at 893. 
 170 While Adams agreed to pursue all claims through arbitration, Circuit City 
undertook no such obligation.  Id. at 894. 
 171 Id. The Circuit City agreement indicates that not only do some employers 
require employees to waive their statutory right to a jury trial, but they can also 
manipulate the arbitration process itself through the agreement.  See infra notes 212-
213 for another example of such manipulation. 
 172 In addition to the specific terms the court found problematic in Circuit City, 
the court also identified an exhaustive list of unfair provisions in the Hooters 
arbitration agreement.  Hooters, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 614-16.  In Gourley v. Yellow Transp., 
L.L.C., the disputed arbitration agreement contained a clause prohibiting the filing 
of post-trial briefs.  178 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Colo. 2001).  The court found the 
agreement unenforceable, because such a restriction would interfere with the ability 
to obtain attorney’s fees under Title VII.  Id. at 1204; see also DeGaetano v. Smith, 
Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (declaring that an arbitration 
agreement is void for public policy if it denies a Title VII claimant the right to 
recover attorney’s fees); Malone v. Bechtel Int’l, Inc., Civil No. 2001/142, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1112, at *3-10 (Dist. V.I. Jan. 22, 2002) (granting motion to compel 
arbitration after conducting intensive, fact-specific inquiry in which the court created 
rather lofty hurdles for unconscionability claims). 
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dispute is within the scope of the agreement,173 and they have used 
that authority when refusing to compel arbitration of statutory 
claims.174  The Wright Court’s development of the “clear and 
unmistakable” standard is an example of how courts may construe 
strictly the scope of an arbitration agreement.175  New Jersey crafted a 
standard similar to Wright in Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP.176  
The arbitration clause in question required arbitration of “[a]ny 
claim or controversy . . . arising out of or relating to this Agreement 
or the breach thereof, or in any way related to the terms and 
conditions” of employment.177  Although seemingly a broad and 
inclusive agreement, the court determined that when the waiver of 
the right to a jury trial178 in favor of arbitration is involved, the 
arbitration clause should “clearly state its purpose” and “any waiver of 
a statutory right ‘must be clearly and unmistakably established.’”179 
A “clear and unmistakable” waiver standard will protect 
employees from signing an unsuspecting waiver and help them to 
better understand their rights regarding arbitration.  This solution, 
however, is merely short-term patchwork.  Employers can easily 
revamp their arbitration clauses to specifically include statutory 
 
 173 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (stating that 
unless the agreement calls for an arbitrator to decide the scope of arbitrability, it is 
for the courts to decide which issues the parties agreed to arbitrate). 
 174 See Wright v. Univ. Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998); Quigley v. 
KPMG Peat Marwick, L.L.P., 330 N.J. Super. 252, 749 A.2d 405 (App. Div.), cert. 
denied, 165 N.J. 527 (2000). 
 175 Wright, 525 U.S. at 82. 
 176 In Quigley, the trial court dismissed the defendant’s age discrimination claim 
under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (LAD), codified at N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 to 
49 (2001).  Quigley, 330 N.J. Super. at 256, 749 A.2d at 407.  The plaintiff argued that 
the arbitration clause was ambiguous and did not encompass claims of 
discrimination under LAD.  Id. at 270, 749 A.2d at 415. 
 177 Id. at 272, 749 A.2d at 416. 
 178 The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination did not originally provide for a 
right to a judicial forum.  Id. at 267, 749 A.2d at 414.  In Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 
the court dismissed an age discrimination claim brought under LAD, ruling that if 
the legislature intended to provide the right to a jury under LAD, it would have 
expressly indicated such intent.  116 N.J. 433, 561 A.2d 1130 (1989).  In response to 
Shaner, the state legislature amended LAD in 1990 to grant a plaintiff the right to a 
jury trial.  See Quigley, 330 N.J. Super. at 267, 749 A.2d at 414; N.J. S.A. § 10:5-13 
(2003). 
 179 Quigley, 330 N.J. Super. at 271, 749 A.2d at 415 (citing Red Bank Reg’l Educ. 
Ass’n v. Red Bank Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 122, 140, 393 A.2d 267, 276 
(1978) (internal quotations omitted)).  The court refused to read the contractual 
language expansively, stating that “[i]f defendant wanted to . . . bind plaintiff to 
arbitration under all circumstances, it should have written an inclusive arbitration 
clause.”  Id. at 273, 749 A.2d at 417.  Apparently, the court was looking for the 
specific mention of discrimination claims or those involving statutory rights.  Id. at 
270, 749 A.2d at 415. 
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claims such as Title VII.  A larger problem, however, still exists: even 
if faced with an explicit arbitration clause, employees must sign the 
agreement if they want a job. 
As the number of employers requiring employees to sign 
mandatory arbitration agreements increases, the debate on the 
application of arbitration agreements to statutory claims continues 
with fervor.180  A major concern is the conflict between the supposed 
“voluntary” nature of arbitration and the lack of employee leverage to 
refuse or renegotiate an arbitration clause.181  Many courts cite Gilmer 
with approval as they enforce agreements to arbitrate Title VII and 
ADA claims.182  It is important, however, to establish a middle ground 
where the pro-arbitration Gilmer policy can be preserved while 
ensuring that the arbitration process is truly “voluntary.”  After all, 
“American workers should not be forced to choose between their jobs 
and their civil rights.”183 
A.  The Retaliation Clause 
This Comment proposes that courts should empower employees 
to refuse to sign away their statutory right to trial for all potential 
future claims.  This proposal does not directly conflict with Gilmer, 
but rather carves out an exception that protects employers from 
taking retaliatory action against employees who “voluntarily” choose 
not to sign an arbitration agreement.  One possible avenue is for 
courts to invoke the anti-retaliation provisions contained in the 
federal employment discrimination statutes.184 
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA all contain anti-retaliation 
clauses that prohibit discrimination against an individual for 
engaging in activity protected under the statute.185  Specifically, the 
 
 180 See supra note 20; see also Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 8 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing to various law review articles that either 
criticize or support the use of mandatory arbitration). 
 181 See Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 9-10 (discussing the legislative history of the 1991 
CRA in which committee members voiced concerns over preserving the voluntary 
nature of arbitration).  Not only do employers include arbitration clauses in their 
standard employment agreements, but they can also be found in job applications, 
meaning that employees must submit to an arbitration provision before even being 
considered for the job.  See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 282-83 (example of employee 
signing agreement contained on job application). 
 182 The First Circuit identified the numerous circuits that have followed Gilmer 
with respect to Title VII claims, including: the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.  Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 10. 
 183 H.R. REP. NO. 40(I)-102d Cong., pt. 1, at 104 (1991). 
 184 See infra note 185. 
 185 The anti-retaliation provision in Title VII can be located at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
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provisions make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against 
an individual because that individual has “opposed any practice made 
an unlawful employment practice by [this Act], or because he has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”186  These anti-retaliation 
statutes exist to enable employees to invoke their statutory rights 
without fear of employer retaliation.187 
The ADA contains an additional anti-retaliation provision that 
may protect an employee who refuses to sign an arbitration 
agreement.188  This provision, which “arguably sweeps more broadly 
than the first,”189 reads: “It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, 
threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or 
enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by this [Act].”190  
According to this language, an employer cannot “interfere” with an 
individual in the exercise of “any right” granted in the ADA.191 
To utilize the ADA’s retaliation statute, a court must first 
determine whether the right to a jury trial in Title VII and ADA cases, 
passed as amendments to Title VII of the 1991 CRA, can co-exist with 
Gilmer.  Second, that court needs to decide if the retaliation clause’s 
reference to “any right granted or protected by this Act” includes 
procedural rights and is not limited to the enumerated substantive 
rights. 
1.  The Jury Trial Right of the 1991 CRA Can Co-Exist With 
Gilmer 
First, it is important to analyze whether Gilmer forecloses a court 
from considering the jury trial right as a basis for invalidating an 
 
3(a) (2003), for the ADA at 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2003), and for the ADEA at 29 
U.S.C. § 623(d) (2003).  Other employment discrimination statutes mentioned in 
this Comment also have anti-retaliation provisions.  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2003) 
(National Labor Relations Act); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2003) (Fair Labor Standards 
Act); and 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2003) (Occupational Safety and Health Act). 
 186 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2003).  The language quoted is almost identical to the 
language found in the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADEA and ADA.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 12203(a) (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (ADEA). 
 187 Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the 
ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63 
MO. L. REV. 115, 118 (1998). 
 188 See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2003).  Title VII and the ADEA do not contain this 
additional provision. 
 189 Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 570 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 789 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(distinguishing between § 12203(a) and § 12203 (b)). 
 190 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2003). 
 191 Id. 
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arbitration agreement.  Gilmer decided that the right to a judicial 
forum does not alter an employee’s substantive rights protected by a 
federal statute.192  Because Gilmer predated the 1991 CRA, however, 
the Court could not consider Congress’s explicit grant of the right to 
a jury trial contained in the Act.193  In Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,194 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sided with Gilmer, 
ruling that Title VII, as amended by the 1991 CRA, does not prohibit 
arbitration agreements.195  The court relied on the Gilmer rule that 
“pre-dispute arbitration clauses should be enforced unless the 
plaintiff could show congressional intent to preclude arbitration.”196  
The court, following Gilmer, found that the statute’s text and 
legislative history did not reveal such intent, and, further, that there 
was no conflict between the goals of arbitration and the goals of Title 
VII.197 
The First Circuit reasoned, in part, that Wright supported its 
reliance on Gilmer.198  This conclusion is flawed because, first, the 
Wright court specifically refused to rule on the validity of a union-
negotiated waiver of a jury right even though it could have invoked 
Gilmer.199  Further, the Wright Court premised its adoption of the 
“clear and unmistakable” standard on the importance of the right to 
a judicial forum, an idea that contradicts the reasoning in Gilmer.200  
 
 192 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628) (“By 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial, forum.”). 
 193 BALES, supra note 12, at 52.  In fact, Gilmer was decided six months before 
passage of the 1991 CRA.  Id. 
 194 Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
1999). 
 195 Id. at 7. 
 196 Id. at 8.  Gilmer states: “[i]f Congress intended the substantive protection 
afforded [by the ADEA] to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial 
forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.”  Gilmer, 500 
U.S. at 29 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628). 
 197 Rosenberg, 170 F.3d 8, 11.  In support of this conclusion, the circuit court 
pointed out that Gilmer endorsed arbitration in an ADEA case even though the ADEA 
provides for a judicial forum.  Id. at 11.  The First Circuit also articulated that the 
“statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function,” whether in 
court or in arbitration.  Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28). 
 198 Id. at 11-12.  The First Circuit argues that Wright reinforces Gilmer, yet 
concludes its analysis weakly: “[b]ut nothing in the opinion suggests that Gilmer is not 
still good law; rather, the contrary is true.”  Id. at 12. 
 199 Wright, 525 U.S. at 77. 
 200 Id. at 80 (stating that whether or not Gardner-Denver survives Gilmer, it “at least 
stands for the proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient 
importance to be protected . . . .”). 
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Although the First Circuit in Rosenberg suggests that the right to a 
judicial forum is not protected under Gilmer, its argument stands on 
shaky ground due to both the post-Gilmer grant of a jury trial right in 
the 1991 CRA and the court’s misguided reliance on Wright, which 
recognizes the importance of the jury right for victims of 
discrimination. 
Despite its sweeping holding, Rosenberg stated “Gilmer does not 
mandate enforcement of all arbitration agreements,” thus leaving 
room for exceptions to be made.201  The relevant portion of the 1991 
CRA amendment to Title VII, Section 118, states: “where appropriate 
and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of 
dispute resolution, including . . . arbitration, is encouraged to resolve 
disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended 
by this title.”202  Even though the Rosenberg court followed Gilmer, it 
refused to enforce the arbitration clause at issue because, under 
Section 118, “agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination 
claims should be enforced only where ‘appropriate.’”203 
While deciding not to enforce the arbitration clause because it 
would not be “appropriate,” the court failed to delineate a standard 
to determine whether an agreement is “appropriate” or not.204  The 
court cited with approval to the Wright “clear and unmistakable” 
requirement imposed on union waivers of a federal judicial forum,205 
claiming it to be a proper use of the “where appropriate” language.206  
Thus, although Rosenberg holds that the 1991 CRA amendments do 
not preclude enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements, the 
court indicates that there are certain situations where arbitration is 
not appropriate.207  With such an undefined standard, the court left 
the door open to other situations where an agreement may be 
inappropriate, such as when an employer fires an employee for 
refusing to sign away the right to a judicial forum. 
It is evident from the Rosenberg court’s application of the “where 
 
 201 Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 16 (emphasis added). 
 202 Id. at 8 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 118, 105 Stat. 1071 
(1991)). 
 203 Id. at 19. 
 204 Id. at 20-21 (stating that arbitration is not appropriate “under these 
circumstances,” without providing any legal analysis).  The court conducted a fact 
specific analysis and determined that enforcing the agreement would not be 
appropriate because, although Rosenberg signed an arbitration clause, she was not 
given a copy of the rules regarding the intended scope of the agreement.  Id. 
 205 See supra notes 130-142 and accompanying text. 
 206 Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 21 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court in Wright 
gave teeth to the “where appropriate” language). 
 207 Id. at 20-21. 
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appropriate” language that Section 118 of the 1991 CRA 
amendments does create situations where Gilmer is limited.  A review 
of the text and legislative history of the 1991 CRA amendments208 is 
instructive for determining where exceptions to Gilmer under the 
“where appropriate” language may exist.  Notably, the legislative 
history strongly suggests that the jury trial right deserves some 
protection. 
Finding a “compelling need” to strengthen Title VII’s 
enforcement measures, Congress’s emphasis on punitive and 
compensatory damages in the 1991 CRA is undeniably intertwined 
with the right to jury trial.209  Furthermore, when discussing the 
purpose of Section 118, the House Committee on Education and 
Labor and the House Committee on the Judiciary stated that 
alternative means of dispute resolution, 
[are] intended to supplement, not supplant the remedies provided 
by Title VII.  Thus, for example, the Committee believes that any 
agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the 
context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an 
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person 
 
 208 As this section focuses primarily on the legislative history, it bears mentioning 
each side of the argument concerning whether or not the text of Section 118 
precludes mandatory arbitration agreements.  One commentator argues that the 
language “where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law” is at best a 
“limited endorsement” of arbitration.  See Cherry, supra note 104, at 286-88 (breaking 
down the text of Section 118 to show that the 1991 CRA precludes pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration contracts).  Another commentator points out that if Congress 
intended to preclude such agreements, the language of Section 118 is hard to 
explain, because it both endorses arbitration and contains no language expressly 
prohibiting mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  BALES, supra note 12, at 
52. 
 209 PERRITT, JR., supra note 64, at 112.  The House Committee on the Judiciary 
found a “serious gap . . . in Title VII, one that leaves victims of intentional 
discrimination on the basis of sex or religion without an effective remedy for many 
forms of bias on the job . . . .”  Id. at 111 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 40-102d Cong., 1st 
Sess., pt. 2, at 24-25 (May 17, 1991)).  Perritt also cites to a House Judiciary Report 
that “went on to recount ‘disturbing testimony’ that was presented to the 
Subcommittee ‘regarding severe consequences of the lack of a damages remedy in 
Title VII for claimants who suffered severe sexual harassment on the job.’”  Id. (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 40-102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 25 (May 17, 1991)). 
In addition to the various statements made by Congress in the legislative history 
of the 1991 CRA, the EEOC issued a policy statement stressing the importance of the 
1991 CRA’s newly created jury right.  See THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, July 10, 1997, at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) (on file with 
author).  The EEOC discourages the use of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration 
agreements, reasoning that the “ultimate responsibility to correct Title VII violations 
should rest with the federal judiciary . . . .”  Cherry, supra note 104, at 291 (discussing 
the content of the EEOC policy statement). 
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from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII.  
This view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Title VII in [Gardner-Denver].210 
The Committee further stated that the inclusion of Section 118 is not 
intended “to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be 
available.”211  Moreover, when Congress rejected a proposed 
amendment that would have explicitly permitted arbitration 
agreements, the House Committee on Education and Labor stated 
that “‘‘under the [proposed amendment] employers could refuse to 
hire workers unless they signed a binding statement waiving all rights 
to file Title VII complaints’ in court and declared that ‘American 
workers should not be forced to choose between their jobs and their 
civil rights.’”212  Finally, according to Professor Bales, the legislative 
history reveals that Congress’ primary concern was that “unequal 
bargaining power would allow an employer to coerce an otherwise 
unwilling employee to sign a compulsory arbitration agreement as a 
condition of employment.”213 
The foregoing analysis reveals that Congress intended to: 1) give 
effect to the 1991 CRA’s new enforcement measures, and 2) preserve 
the voluntary nature by which employees and employers enter into 
arbitration agreements.  Importantly, Rosenberg and Wright signify that 
the right to judicial proceedings granted under the 1991 CRA 
amendments can co-exist with the pro-arbitration stance of Gilmer.  
Moreover, there are no indications that these two examples are 
exclusive of the circumstances where “the right to a federal judicial 
forum [was] of sufficient importance to be protected.”214  When 
combining the fact that the 1991 CRA added a jury trial right to Title 
 
 210 BALES, supra note 12, at 51-52; see also Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 9 n.5 (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 41 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 735). 
 211 BALES, supra note 12, at 52; see also Cherry, supra note 104, at 289 (citing to a 
statement made by Representative Edwards, Chair of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, after Gilmer but prior to passage of the 1991 CRA: “no 
approval whatsoever is intended of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in [Gilmer] . 
. . .”). 
 212 Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 9-10 (quoting H.R. Rep No. 102-40(I), at 104 (1991), 
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 642) (internal quotations omitted). 
 213 BALES, supra note 12, at 52.  Professor Bales’s observation is especially telling in 
light of Congress’s general assumption that it intended to support mandatory 
arbitration so long as the arbitration agreement was voluntarily signed.  Cherry, supra 
note 104, at 289.  Representative Henry Hyde believed that Section 118 encouraged 
binding arbitration “where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these 
methods.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Also, the strong pro-arbitration statements of 
former President Bush upon signing the 1991 CRA stressed that Section 118 
encourages “voluntary” arbitration agreements.  Id. at 290-91. 
 214 Wright, 525 U.S. at 80. 
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VII and ADA claims with the 1991 CRA’s persuasive legislative history, 
it is clear that the right to a jury trial should not be ignored. 
2.  The ADA’s Jury Trial Right Granted by the 1991 CRA Is 
Protected by the ADA’s Retaliation Clause 
At the outset, it is important to distinguish the anti-retaliation 
statutes contained in Title VII, the ADEA, and Section 12203(a) of 
the ADA from the second anti-retaliation provision of the ADA, 
Section 12203(b).215  The first three statutes proscribe retaliatory 
action against an individual “because he has opposed any practice 
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter . . . or 
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter.”216  These statutes require employees to engage in 
“protected activity,” either by participating in the exercise of one’s 
rights or opposing an unlawful employment practice.217 
Section 12203(b) of the ADA, however, makes it unlawful to 
“coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere” with an employee’s 
“exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by this 
[Act].”218  Although Section 12203(a) requires an employee to engage 
 
 215 See supra note 188. 
 216 See supra note 186.  To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, a 
claimant must show: “(1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the 
employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; 
and (3) a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity and the 
employer’s adverse action.”  Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-68 (3d 
Cir. 2002); see also Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1264 (10th Cir. 
2001). 
 217 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2003); see also EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & 
Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g granted, 319 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 
2003).  An employee must comply with either the “opposition clause,” whereby an 
employee opposes an employment practice made illegal under the statutes, or the 
“participation clause,” which requires an employee to make a charge, testify, assist, or 
participate in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) 
(2003). 
 218 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2003) (emphasis added).  The Ninth Circuit recently 
entertained a retaliation claim when employer Luce Forward withdrew plaintiff 
employee’s conditional employment offer for objecting to and refusing to sign the 
company’s arbitration clause.  Luce, 303 F.3d at 997.  The court ruled that the 
plaintiff could not satisfy the “opposition clause” because he “could not have 
reasonably believed that Luce Forward’s policy of requiring arbitration was an 
unlawful employment practice.”  Id. at 1006.  The EEOC argued that plaintiff met 
the “participation clause” because he refused to surrender his right to participate.  
Id. at 1007.  The EEOC stated that the employer’s “practice of refusing to employ any 
individual who will not sign a compulsory waiver . . . is effectively a preemptive strike 
against future participation conduct afforded absolute protection under [the 
statutes].”  Id.  The court found no merit in this argument, claiming that Gilmer’s 
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in “protected activity,” Section 12203(b) contains no such 
requirement.219  Instead, an employee may seek the protection of 
Section 12203(b) if an employer “interferes” with the employee’s 
exercise of rights.220  Thus, an employee who is fired for refusing to 
sign away a statutory right undoubtedly falls within the scope of 
Section 12203(b). 
Still undetermined, however, is whether “any right” includes the 
right to a jury trial.  “The right to a jury trial is a procedural right,”221 
as compared to the right of a disabled individual to be free from 
discrimination in employment, which is a substantive right.222  Section 
12203(b), however, prevents employers from interfering with “any 
right,” whether substantive or procedural.223  The right to a jury trial 
granted in the 1991 CRA is not merely a minor amendment to Title 
VII and the ADA; rather, it represents the means by which an 
employee can pursue damages.224  A 1991 House Judiciary Committee 
report indicates that the whole purpose behind the jury trial right was 
to satisfy the “compelling need” to permit damage awards to Title VII 
claimants.225  Thus, the procedural right at issue is one specifically 
granted by statute and is intertwined with the statute’s remedial 
scheme.226  Therefore, it follows that prohibiting interference with the 
exercise of “any right,” would include the procedural rights needed 
to enforce the substantive rights. 
By analogy, the ADEA also grants the right to a jury trial.227  
Congress amended the ADEA in 1990 to provide that “[a]n 
individual may not waive any right or claim under this Act unless the 
waiver is knowing and voluntary.”228  When faced with deciding the 
scope of the waiver provision, some courts have ruled that “any right” 
 
refusal to recognize a judicial forum as a substantive right permits an employer to 
demand its waiver as a condition of employment.  Id.  On February 7, 2003, the 
Ninth Circuit vacated the opinion and granted a rehearing, en banc.  EEOC v. Luce, 
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 319 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 219 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)-(b) (2003). 
 220 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2003). 
 221 Hammaker v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 222 42 U.S.C. § 12111-117 (2003). 
 223 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2003). 
 224 See Ackerman v. The Money Store, 321 N.J. Super. 308, 318, 728 A.2d 873, 878 
(Law. Div. 1998) (using similar language to describe the importance of the 
procedural enforcement measures contained in the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination). 
 225 PERRITT, JR., supra note 64, at 112. 
 226 See supra note 209. 
 227 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (2003). 
 228 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2003) (emphasis added). 
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applies only to the ADEA’s substantive rights.229  Rather than rely on 
these previous circuit court decisions, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia in Hammaker v. Brown & Brown, 
Inc.230 applied regular tools of statutory construction and determined 
that the waiver requirement applied to both substantive and 
procedural rights.231  The court found that “any right” encompassed 
all rights under the ADEA, including the right to a jury trial.232  
Hammaker found the prior circuit courts’ reliance on Gilmer 
misplaced because “Gilmer does not directly consider the effect of the 
[waiver amendment] to procedural rights because the contract in 
that case was executed prior to the [waiver amendment’s] effective 
date.”233 
Additionally, a provision similar to Section 12203(b) of the ADA 
can be found in New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”),234 
the state’s employment discrimination statute.235  In Ackerman v. The 
Money Store,236 an employee was fired from her job after refusing to 
sign an arbitration agreement which would have required the 
arbitration of all discrimination claims and claims for the violation of 
any state or federal statute.237  The plaintiff argued that “conditioning 
employment on the execution of an agreement to arbitrate 
 
 229 See Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 660-61 (5th Cir. 1995); 
Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1998); Rosenberg, 170 
F.3d at 14-15. 
 230 Hammaker v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 231 Hammaker, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 580. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. at 579. 
 234 N.J.SA. § 10:5-1 to 49 (2003). 
 235 The LAD is codified at N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 to 49 (2003).  The anti-retaliation 
provision, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(d) (2003), makes it unlawful to “coerce, intimidate, 
threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right 
granted or protected by this act.”  Almost every state has a state equivalent to the 
federal employment discrimination statutes.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 951-63 (2003); Washington’s Law Against Discrimination, 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60 (2003); the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. VA. 
CODE §§ 5-11-1 to 5-11-21 (2003); Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 
216.1-216.20 (2003); and Arizona’s Civil Rights Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1461 
to 41-1484 (2003). 
 236 321 N.J. Super. 308, 728 A.2d 873 (Law. Div. 1998). 
 237 Id.  Ackerman worked for two months as a mortgage funder/closer before her 
discharge.  Id. at 311-12, 728 A.2d at 874-75.  The Money Store’s arbitration 
agreement contained the type of clear and explicit language that likely would have 
passed muster under the “clear and unmistakable” standard advocated by the New 
Jersey courts, had Ackerman chosen to sign it.  Id. at 311, 728 A.2d at 875; see also 
Quigley, 330 N.J. Super. at 273, 749 A.2d at 417 (stating that if employer wants to bind 
employee to arbitration agreement, it “should have written an inclusive arbitration 
clause”). 
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employment discrimination claims interferes with plaintiff’s rights 
under the LAD,” namely, the right to pursue claims of discrimination 
in a judicial forum.238  Ackerman further contended that this right is 
essential to “achieve LAD’s goal to eradicate discrimination.”239  The 
court agreed, holding that while the right to a jury trial for claims 
under the LAD “may be waived by an employee who chooses to do 
so,” it “should not be withdrawn as a condition of employment.”240  
The court ruled that The Money Store violated LAD’s retaliation 
clause when it discharged Ackerman for refusing to give up her 
statutory right to a jury trial.241 
The court in Hammaker held that the ADEA’s provision requiring 
a clear and unmistakable waiver of any right contained in the ADEA 
included the right to a jury trial.242  That logic can be equally applied 
to section 12203(b) of the ADA which prohibits an employer from 
interfering with any right granted in the ADA.  Furthermore, the 
court in Ackerman ruled that the anti-retaliation provision of New 
Jersey’s LAD, a provision strikingly similar to section 12203(b), 
prohibits an employer from firing an employee for his or her refusal 
to sign an arbitration agreement that would result in a waiver of the 
right to a jury trial for all employment discrimination claims.243  The 
Ackerman reasoning should be extended to section 12203(b) such 
that when an employer fires an employee for refusing to sign an 
arbitration agreement, that employer is interfering with the 
employee’s right to a jury trial granted under the ADA.  Thus, section 
12203(b) should offer protection to employees who attempt to 
preserve their statutory right to a judicial forum. 
CONCLUSION 
Gilmer and the 1991 CRA amendments granting Title VII and 
ADA claimants the right to a jury trial can co-exist.  While upholding 
Gilmer’s basic tenet that statutory employment discrimination claims 
 
 238 Ackerman, 321 N.J. Super. at 317, 728 A.2d at 878. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. at 325, 728 A.2d at 882. 
 241 Id. at 318, 728 A.2d at 878.  It is important to note, however, that the Ackerman 
decision stands on narrow ground.  In Quigley, the plaintiff argued that the 
arbitration agreement was invalid because he signed it only upon being threatened 
with discharge.  Quigley, 330 N.J. Super. at  262-63, 749 A.2d at 411.  The plaintiff 
invoked the Ackerman holding to support his claim, but the court distinguished the 
case on the facts, reasoning that Ackerman never signed the arbitration agreement, 
while Quigley did.  Id. at 265, 749 A.2d at 413. 
 242 Hammaker, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 580. 
 243 Ackerman, 321 N.J. Super. 308, 728 A.2d 873. 
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are arbitrable under the FAA, courts have also carved out exceptions 
under the “where appropriate” language.  As its legislative history 
clearly exhibits, the 1991 CRA’s endorsement of arbitration is 
premised on the voluntary nature of the arbitration agreement, thus 
indicating that involuntary agreements are perhaps not 
“appropriate.”  When individuals are either fired or refused 
employment for declining to sign an arbitration agreement, the 
process becomes involuntary: sign the agreement in order to work.  
The ADA’s anti-retaliation provision arguably restores the voluntary 
nature to the arbitration process by protecting employees in the 
exercise of their statutory rights. 
By invoking the protection of section 12203(b) of the ADA, an 
employee may not be fired for refusing to waive his/her right to a 
judicial forum for statutory employment claims.  The logical result is 
increased bargaining power for employees, who can reject broad, 
compulsory arbitration agreements and can instead negotiate the 
terms of an arbitration clause to reach a mutual agreement with the 
employer.  Although Title VII and the ADEA do not contain similar 
provisions to that of the ADA, amending these statutes to insert a 
section 12203(b) counterpart could help Congress achieve a healthy 
balance between the pro-arbitration FAA and the adjudicatory goals 
of the employment discrimination statutes. 
The ongoing scrutiny of the arbitration machinery offered 
throughout this analysis is not intended to cast doubt on its utility 
and value.  When viewed in light of the important civil rights 
initiatives bestowed upon employers and employees by Congress, 
however, the potential drawbacks of arbitration appear costly.  
Congress clearly provided employees victimized by workplace 
discrimination an opportunity for vindication in federal court.  This 
is not to say that arbitration is never a suitable alternative, but rather 
that barring the option of a judicial forum limits the overall 
effectiveness with which these important statutes can be enforced.  
Although it is impractical to preclude the use of arbitration 
agreements in employment contracts and CBAs across the board, it is 
important to tighten the reins on the commandeering use of such 
agreements by employers.  Specifically, resort to arbitration with 
regard to civil rights claims should be the product of a mutual 
agreement rather than be forced upon employees as a condition of 
employment.  A way to accomplish this is for courts to enforce anti-
retaliation statutes against employers for taking action against an 
individual for refusing to sign away the statutory right to trial.  A 
retaliation claim does not represent two bites at the same apple, but 
rather a sensible inroad to the restoration of employee rights 
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guaranteed by Congress. 
